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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1042 
_____________ 
 
THE ESTATE OF ANDREA YVONNE ARRINGTON, 
Deceased, by and through the Administratrix of the Estate, 
Audra L. Thornton Arrington 
 
v. 
 
JOHN MICHAEL, Police Officer; CITY OF CHESTER 
 
 
John Michael, 
         Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 11-cv-4534) 
District Judge:  Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
October 17, 2013 
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Before:   RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  December 24, 2013) 
_______________ 
 
Suzanne McDonough   [ARGUED] 
Holsten & Associates 
One Olive Street 
Media, PA   19063 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Frank N. DiMeo, Jr.   [ARGUED] 
James D. Rosen 
Rosen, Schafer & DiMeo 
121 S. Broad Street – Ste. 800 
Philadelphia, PA   19107 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this substantive due process action involving the 
murder of a young woman, Officer John Michael of the 
Chester, Pennsylvania, police force appeals the denial of 
summary judgment by the United States District Court for the  
 
_______________ 
          *Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Court of 
Appeals Senior Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by 
designation.
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  He claims both qualified 
and statutory immunity.  Since his conduct falls squarely 
within the immunity established by the Child Safety Lock Act 
of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3), we need not address his claim 
for qualified immunity and will reverse the decision of the 
District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. 
  
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
 On July 20, 2009, Michael’s son Aaron shot Andrea 
Arrington eight times, killing her.  It was the tragic 
culmination of an abusive relationship.  Aaron used his 
father’s service-issued Smith & Wesson handgun in the 
murder.   
 
Arrington and Aaron had lived together in an 
apartment with their infant son from 2007 to July 2, 2009, 
when Arrington petitioned for and obtained a temporary 
protection from abuse order (the “PFA”) against Aaron.  The 
order described Aaron’s history of violence against 
Arrington, including incidents of choking, slapping, and, on 
one occasion two years prior to the PFA’s issuance, giving 
Arrington a black eye.  Those assaults were not the only 
illegality in Aaron’s past.  He had a criminal history that 
included check fraud (for which he was serving probation at 
the time he murdered Arrington), intimidation of another 
woman with whom he had a child,
 
and shoplifting as a 
juvenile.  He had also been charged with “indecent 
assault/rape” but was eventually found not guilty.  (App. at 
408.)  Michael was aware of his son’s several encounters with 
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the law.
1
  Although Aaron was a legal adult, he continued to 
have a room in his father’s home, to drive his father’s truck, 
and to receive mail at his father’s address.    
 
After the temporary PFA was issued, Michael met with 
Aaron to discuss the PFA.  Aaron considered the order to be 
inaccurate and told Michael that he would go to court on 
July 9, as required, to contest it in person.  Michael advised 
Aaron that, in the meantime, he should not try to retrieve his 
personal belongings from Arrington’s apartment unless 
escorted by police officers.  On July 9, 2009, a final PFA was 
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, 
which extended the terms of the temporary PFA by six 
months.  Pursuant to the final PFA, Aaron was evicted from 
the apartment and forbidden from possessing firearms.            
 
On July 14, 2009 – five days after the final PFA was 
issued and less than a week before the murder – Aaron 
violated the PFA by returning to Arrington’s apartment and 
threatening to “cut her up” if she reported the violation.  
(Appellee’s Br. at 6; App. at 147.)  Despite that threat, 
Arrington promptly called the police.  Chester Police Officer 
William Swanson was on patrol and responded to the call, 
which became the subject of a criminal complaint that 
Swanson filed against Aaron the next day.  An arrest warrant 
for Aaron issued several days later, on July 20, 2009.      
 
                                              
 
1
 Michael also knew that two of Aaron’s children had 
died under mysterious circumstances while in Aaron’s 
custody, including the child of the woman he had intimidated.  
After he murdered Arrington, Aaron confessed to two of his 
friends that he had killed those children.    
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 Soon after Aaron left Arrington’s apartment on 
July 14, Michael received a phone call from one of Aaron’s 
friends, stating that Aaron had violated the PFA.  Michael 
subsequently contacted Captain Anita Amaro, the chief of the 
Chester Police Department, to find out “[w]hat was going 
on.”  (App. at 424.)  The Captain confirmed that Aaron had 
violated the PFA and that a warrant would soon be issued for 
his arrest; she also provided Michael a copy of Officer 
Swanson’s complaint.  Although Michael then attempted to 
call his son several times, he was unable to reach him.   
 
With a planned vacation to Florida only days away and 
his son still out of contact, Michael resorted to writing Aaron 
two notes on July 16.  He left the notes for Aaron on his 
dining room table, alongside Aaron’s mail, hoping that Aaron 
would see them when he came over to pick up the mail.  The 
notes reveal Michael pleading with Aaron to turn himself in.  
In the first note, Michael said that Aaron’s violation was “not 
that serious” and that, if Aaron cooperated with the police, 
Michael would not only pay him a “bonus” of $1,500 but also 
post his bail.  (Id. at 225.)   At the same time, he asked Aaron 
to return his truck or else he would report it “stolen/or 
missing.”  (Id. at 244.)  In the second note, Michael noted 
that, in the “worse scenario,” Aaron would have to go to jail 
but that plenty of other people have been locked up.  (Id. at 
226.)  Michael also claimed that, because he was a police 
officer, Aaron would get “a courtesy break.”  (Id.)  In fact, he 
said, he had already spoken to people about Aaron’s situation.  
(Id. at 226-27.)  Fatefully, Michael also left the copy of 
Officer Swanson’s criminal complaint for Aaron to read, 
which described Arrington’s report to the police, including 
that Aaron had threatened to “cut her up” if she reported the 
PFA violation.   
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The day after Michael wrote his letters to Aaron, 
Aaron left a voice-message on Michael’s home answering 
machine, saying that he was “okay” and would turn himself in 
when the arrest warrant was issued.  (Id. at 425.)  At that 
point, Aaron had not yet returned to his father’s home and 
read the notes or the complaint.  Michael heard the message 
that same day but did not remove the notes or the criminal 
complaint.  The papers remained undisturbed on the dining 
room table when Michael departed for Florida on July 20.   
 
In preparing to leave on vacation, Michael brought his 
service weapon home with him and locked it in his bedroom, 
as he customarily did when away.  He had a wooden bedroom 
door that he locked with a “single-bolt lock,” keeping one key 
on his key chain and the other hidden in the kitchen.  (Id. at 
415-16.)  Inside the bedroom, Michael locked the gun itself 
with a police department-issued gun lock.  He hid one key to 
the gun lock in a dresser drawer and the other he kept in his 
possession.  He stored the magazine and the ammunition 
separately in a duffle bag, which he kept in a corner of the 
bedroom.   
 
Michael maintains that he complied with standard 
police policy in storing his weapon.  According to a Chester 
Police Department directive, it was optional, though 
“preferred,” for off-duty officers to take their weapons home.  
(Id. at 380.)  Captain James Chubb, a firearms instructor for 
the Department, stated in his deposition that, while “nothing 
is as safe as no weapon at home” (id. at 504), keeping a 
weapon at home is preferable to keeping it at the police 
station.  Captain Chubb said, “it is a safety issue if an officer 
is done [with] work, puts his weapon in the locker, and then 
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decides to walk out to his vehicle in full uniform with no 
gun.”  (Id.) 
 
At some point on July 20, 2009, while Michael was in 
Florida, Aaron went to his father’s home and, after finishing a 
bottle of 99-proof alcohol, read the notes and police 
complaint that his father had left for him, moving them from 
the dining room table to the bedroom he customarily slept in 
while at his father’s home.  He then broke down his father’s 
bedroom door and ransacked the room.   He found the gun 
lock key in his father’s drawer and the ammunition in the 
duffle bag.  He next turned to a methodical search of the 
Internet to learn how to load the weapon, disengage the 
safety, and otherwise operate the gun.  After that, he tracked 
Arrington down and shot her to death.   
 
Following the murder, Aaron telephoned two of his 
friends and confessed to the crime – including a description 
of breaking into his father’s bedroom and learning online how 
to operate the weapon.  Shortly thereafter, Chester police 
officers shot and killed Aaron while he stood outside his 
father’s home, brandishing the pistol.   
 
Arrington’s estate (the “Estate”), by and through its 
Administratrix, brought this action against Michael for civil 
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of 
Arrington’s substantive due process right to bodily integrity.  
The District Court denied Michael’s motion for summary 
judgment asserting qualified immunity and statutory 
immunity.  The Court found that “[m]aterial disputes [] exist 
about the factual predicates necessary to apply the doctrine of 
qualified immunity to shield Officer Michael from suit.”  (Id. 
at 23.)  With respect to the statutory immunity claim under 
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the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005 (“CSLA”), which grants 
immunity when a handgun is made “inoperable” by the use of 
a safety lock, the Court held the statute to be ambiguous and 
similarly determined that “material factual disputes exist on 
this record about whether the statute immunizes Officer 
Michael from civil liability in these circumstances.”  (Id.)  
This timely appeal followed.    
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
As a threshold matter, we must consider our 
jurisdiction.   
 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we are empowered to review 
district court rulings that finally resolve cases, which the 
denial of immunity here clearly does not.  However, in Cohen 
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the 
Supreme Court noted that there exists a “small class [of 
decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable 
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, [that are] 
too important to be denied review and too independent of the 
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred 
until the whole case is adjudicated.”  Id. at 546.  Such 
decisions can be reviewed on appeal before a final judgment 
is rendered.  Rulings on qualified immunity are a common 
example.  While a judicial creation, qualified immunity is, as 
the Supreme Court has long recognized, an “immunity from 
suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and ... is 
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to 
trial.”  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).  As 
more fully discussed below, the statutory immunity provided 
in the CSLA is likewise an immunity from suit, and “[w]hen 
a policy is embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision 
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entitling a party to immunity from suit (a rare form of 
protection), there is little room for the judiciary to gainsay its 
‘importance.’”2  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994).  We therefore treat the denial of 
such immunity as a final order fitting within Cohen’s “small 
class” of decisions, and adjudge the order here to be 
immediately appealable.   
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
denial of summary judgment.  Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 590 F.3d 239, 244 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2009).  More particularly, because the denial of immunity in 
this case turns on statutory construction, we review the matter 
de novo, recognizing that statutory construction is “peculiarly 
appropriate for independent judicial ascertainment.”  Dunat v. 
Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1961) (quoting O’Leary 
                                              
 
2
 We note an additional comparison to qualified 
immunity.  That doctrine furthers a public interest in “the 
need to induce government officials to show reasonable 
initiative when the relevant law is not ‘clearly established.’”  
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 (2006) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  It extends immunity 
from suit so long as the behavior fits within the doctrine’s 
parameters.  Similarly, the CSLA reflects a congressional 
judgment about the parameters of reasonable behavior in 
securing guns (and thus preventing violence); it extends 
immunity when the behavior fits within the parameters 
Congress defined.  That congressional judgment extends a 
narrowly defined, rarely extended protection, see Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 
(1994), one sufficiently analogous to qualified immunity that 
we find its denial immediately appealable.   
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v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); cf. Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children 
& Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Under the 
collateral order doctrine, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 confers appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court's denial, at the summary-
judgment stage, of defendants’ claim that they are entitled to 
absolute or qualified immunity, to the extent that denial turns 
on questions of law.”).  
 
III.  Discussion 
 
 The CSLA provides, in pertinent part:  
 
(z) Secure Gun Storage or Safety Device. – 
(3) Liability for use. – 
(A) In general. – 
Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a person who has lawful possession 
and control of a handgun, and who uses a 
secure gun storage or safety device with 
the handgun, shall be entitled to 
immunity from a qualified civil liability 
action. 
(B) Prospective actions. – A 
qualified civil liability action may not be 
brought in any Federal or State court. 
(C) Defined term. – As used in 
this paragraph, the term “qualified civil 
liability action”-- 
(i) means a civil action 
brought by any person against a 
person described in subparagraph 
(A) for damages resulting from 
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the criminal or unlawful misuse of 
the handgun by a third party, if-- 
(I) the handgun was 
accessed by another person 
who did not have the 
permission or authorization 
of the person having lawful 
possession and control of 
the handgun to have access 
to it; and 
(II) at the time 
access was gained by the 
person not so authorized, 
the handgun had been 
made inoperable by use of 
a secure gun storage or 
safety device; and 
(ii) shall not include an 
action brought against the person 
having lawful possession and 
control of the handgun for 
negligent entrustment or 
negligence per se. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3) (emphasis added).   
 
The District Court concluded that there is ambiguity in 
the italicized language, and therefore that the present dispute 
is appropriate for jury consideration.  According to the Court,  
 
Congress’ use of the term ‘inoperable’ [within 
§ 922(z)(3)] is puzzling.  A strict reading of the 
term ‘inoperable’ would make it impossible for 
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the immunity provision to apply at all [because] 
a third-party, no matter how determined, cannot 
fire a truly ‘inoperable’ firearm and could, 
therefore, cause no harm which might result in 
liability from which the statute may immunize 
him or her.   
 
(App. at 24-25.)  On the other hand, the District Court noted, 
“a loose reading of the term ‘inoperable’ does not accord with 
the word’s plain meaning.”  (Id. at 25.)  Thus, the Court 
decided that “the intended scope of the immunity provision 
[is] ambiguous” and warranted resort to legislative history to 
ascertain Congress’s true intent.  (Id.)  Citing one 
Congressman’s interpretation that the immunity language 
“neither creates nor eliminates liability for gun owners who 
use safety devices,” the Court applied “common law rules” to 
determine that “the secure gun storage or safety device must 
make the firearm inoperable by reasonably foreseeable 
means.”  (Id. at 26 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).)  Because of what the Court found to be 
“material factual disputes [] about whether Officer Michael’s 
actions actually rendered his service weapon ‘inoperable’ by 
reasonably foreseeable means” (id. at 27), it denied Michael’s 
motion for summary judgment based on his claim of statutory 
immunity.     
 
We disagree with that reasoning, which went awry at 
the first step.  There is nothing ambiguous in the language of 
§ 922(z)(3).  It is true that, in the face of statutory ambiguity 
or uncertainty, we may “have recourse to the legislative 
history of the measure and the statements by those in charge 
of it during its consideration by the Congress,” United States 
v. Great N. Ry., 287 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932), but “we do not 
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resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is 
clear,” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994).   
In this case, the interpretation of the statute is not a 
“factual dispute” that requires jury deliberation, but rather a 
pure question of law.  Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528.  By its terms, 
the CSLA provides that, as long as an individual with lawful 
control of a gun has utilized a secure gun storage or safety 
device and has not authorized or permitted access to the gun, 
he or she is immune from suit in any “qualified civil liability 
action.”  18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3)(A).  A qualified civil liability 
action is defined, with limited exceptions not relevant here, as 
a suit “for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful 
misuse of the handgun by a third party” when there was 
unauthorized access to the handgun and “the handgun had 
been made inoperable by use of a secure gun storage or safety 
device.”  Id. § 922(z)(3)(C).  The present fact pattern is 
plainly within that definition.  The access gained by Aaron 
was clearly unauthorized.  Moreover, the meaning of the 
word “inoperable” is clear.  It refers to the use of a secure gun 
storage or safety device to prevent a gun from firing, the 
pertinent language being “inoperable by use of a secure gun 
storage or safety device.”  Id.  § 922(z)(3)(C)(i)(II) (emphasis 
added).  In other words, an individual is immune from suit if 
the handgun was rendered unusable because of a gun storage 
or safety device.   
 
Taking its cue from the District Court, the Estate now 
disputes Michael’s assertion of statutory immunity because of 
that same “ambiguity” surrounding the word “inoperable.”  
(Appellee’s Br. at 28-29.)  The Estate contends that “a 
reasonable jury may find having the key near the lock is the 
equivalent of not using the lock.”  (Id.  at 29.)  But the Estate 
fails to consider the plain facts before us: that the gun was 
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locked behind a dead-bolted door, its key hidden in a dresser-
drawer, and its ammunition separately hidden in a duffle bag 
in the corner of the bedroom.  Outside of baldly challenging 
that the gun was indeed inoperable, the Estate never disputes 
that Michael’s conduct in fact met the conditions set for 
immunity – perhaps, because it could not do so with any 
credibility on this record.  Not only did Michael never give 
Aaron “permission or authorization ... to have access to [the 
gun],”  18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3), but Michael used a  “secure 
gun storage or safety device” in storing his weapon.  Id.  His 
conduct in no other way removed him from the statute’s 
protection.  While the statute abrogates immunity when a gun 
owner negligently entrusts a gun or acts with negligence per 
se, id. § 922(z)(3)(C)(ii), the Estate never expressly argues 
that Michael acted with such negligence.  But even if it had, 
nothing in the record suggests that Michael’s conduct with 
respect to his handgun was negligent, let alone that it rose to 
the level of negligence that would cause him to lose the 
statutory grant of immunity.
 3
  On the contrary, Michael took 
reasonable precautions to ensure that nobody – including 
Aaron – would have access to his gun.  Given the significant 
care that Michael had taken to secure the weapon, the present 
§ 1983 action appears to be exactly the kind of case that 
Congress wanted to prevent when it passed the CSLA. While 
                                              
 
3
 Negligent entrustment is defined as “[t]he act of 
leaving a dangerous article (such as a gun or car) with a 
person who the lender knows or, should know, is likely to use 
it in an unreasonably risky manner,” while negligence per se 
is defined as “[n]egligence established as a matter of law, so 
that breach of the duty is not a jury question.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1135 (9th ed. 2009).  Michael’s conduct does 
not meet either definition.    
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there may exist circumstances that give rise to a claim of 
negligent entrustment or negligence per se, or where the use 
of a gun lock or safety device does not render a gun 
inoperable, those are not questions we need now consider.  
The facts of this case establish that Michael’s conduct is fully 
protected by the CSLA and he is immune from suit.   
 
That conclusion is unaffected by the District Court’s 
reliance on a single Congressman’s comments in the 
legislative history.  “[S]elective invocation of fragments of 
the floor debate is an object lesson in the perils of appealing 
to ... legislative history as a guide to statutory meaning. ... 
The law is what Congress enacts, not what its members say 
on the floor.”   Szehinskyj v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 253, 256 
(3d Cir. 2005).  Congress’s decision to grant immunity from 
suit in the CSLA is embodied in clear language that we are 
bound to follow.
4
  Officer Michael is, by the terms of the 
statute, entitled to that immunity, and the claims against him 
must be dismissed.     
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint. 
                                              
 
4
 No one has argued that the CSLA unlawfully 
impinges on the constitutional guarantees protected by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and, given the specific and circumscribed 
character of the immunity, eschewing such an argument 
appears to have been wise.      
